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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff-appellee, Bonneville
Properties, Inc. ("Bonneville"), for breach of contract and
unjust enrichment against defendant-appellant, Dan Simons
("Simons"), over the amount of a real estate conunission
allegedly earned by virtue of a unilateral contract of subagency.
DISPOSITTON OF THE LOWER COURT
Judgment was entered on December 22, 1981, by the
Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge, in favor of
Bonneville and against Simons in the sum of $11,000.00, together with prejudgment interest in the sum of $3,703.23,
calculated at the rate of six percent per annum, and costs of
$222.60, following a trial to the court.

The judgment was

based upon an of fer of a unilateral contract of subagency
arising through the advertisement by Simons, a listing agent,
of his listing agreement with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors
Multiple Listing Service.
8).

(Findings of Fact numbers 6 through

The trial court held, inter alia, that Simons could not

revoke or change the of fer of subagency after Bonneville
initiated action on the unilateral offer, without regard for
whether a ready, willing and able purchaser on the terms
specified in the offer had actually been produced.

(Findings
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of Fact numbers 5, 15, 20 through 23; Conclusions of Law
number 5).
RELIEF. SOUGHT ON APP.EAL
Simons respectfully requests this court to reverse
the lower court,. s judgment for the reasons that
supported by the facts, and

(2).

Cl)

it is un-

it is incorrect as a matter

of law.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The basic facts, most of which were stipulated by
the parties, are as follows:
Essentially, this appeal involves a listing agreement of Simons' published by the Salt Lake Board of Realtors
Multiple Listing Service concerning a warehouse located at
2350 South 2300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, known as Fashion
Fabrics.

On January 2, 1975, Simons changed his commission

split, reducing the share of the commission payable to the
selling broker from 60 percent to 40 percent.
published and effective on January 10, 1975.

The change was
The property

was sold pursuant to contingent documents dated February 3,
1975, which closed at some point between March 15 and April
15, 1975, and Bonneville was paid 40 percent of the commission
as per the published conunission split in effect at that;. date.
(Tr. 3-4, Ex. 6).
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Bonneville is a Utah corporation.

L. Richard

Sorensen (nsorensen'') is the controlling shareholder and
chief executive officer of Bonneville, is a licensed real
estate broker and does business as "Bonneville Properties."
At the times material to this action Dennis Christensen
("Christensen") worked with Bonneville as a licensed real
estate agent.

By the terms of his agreement, any commissions

due Sorensen or Bonneville on sales generated by Christensen
would be divided fifty-fifty between them after deducting ten
percent for expenses.

(Tr. 5).

Simons is a licensed real estate broker doing business at the material time as Real Estate Consultants.

Simons

has been a licensed real estate agent since 1959 and a
licensed real estate broker since 1968.

He has extensive
I

experience in the highly specialized commercial and industrial
aspect of the real estate business and has served his pro1

fession in numerous capacities, having been for example,
Regional Vice President of the National Association of Realtors,
Rocky Mountain Region, 1981-82; President of Utah Association
of Realtors, 1979-80; and President of Salt Lake Board of
Realtors, 1974-75.

(Tr. 5-6).

On or about September 25, 1974, Simons entered into
an exclusive listing agreement with Fashion

Fab~±.cs,

lnc. for

the sale of the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse located at 2350
South 2300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah.

(.Tr. 6)

(~x.

3).

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-3-

Simons advertised the property for sale through the
Salt Lake Board of Realtors Multiple Listing Service.

(Ex. 1).

The Multiple Listing Service, for purposes of this suit, was
an arrangement whereby member brokers extended an open, unilateral offer of subagency, for a stipulated commission split,
to other member brokers with respect to properties listed with
the offering broker.

Otherwise, the tenns of the offer were

at least in part defined by the rules of the Multiple Listing
Service.

Simons and Sorensen were both members of the

Multiple Listing Service.

(Tr. 6).

When the Fashion Fabrics property was first advertised through the Multiple Listing Service, Simons' published
commission split with the Salt Lake Board of Realtors was
sixty percent to the selling broker and forty percent to the
listing broker. ·on or about January 2, 1975, Simons wrote a
letter to the Salt Lake Board of Realtors changing his

com~

mission split to sixty percent to the listing broker and
forty percent to the selling broker.

This notice of change

of commission split was effective on January 10, 1975, when
it was published in the January 10, 1975, Multiple Listing
Service book.

(Tr. 6-7).

The rules of the Salt Lake Board of Realtors
Multiple Listing Service in effect at the material time,
which at least in part constituted terms of any unilateral
contract reached, stipulated that a commission split must

-4-
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remain in effect for at least twenty days but could be
changed thereafter at any time by giving written notice to
the Board, effective when published in the next Multiple
Listing Service book.

When Simons changed,his conunission

split, no written offer had been submitted or reached by the
eventual purchaser of the Fashion Fabrics warehouse which was
an essential ingredient of the eventual sale.

(Finding of

Fact number 16; Tr. 7-8).
In mid-1974, the Adnan and Essam

Kash~9gi

families

became interested in developing what is now the Salt Lake
International Center.

In August, 1974, the Kashoggi families

formed a Utah corporation known as A. K. Utah Properties,
Inc., d/b/a the Salt Lake International Center, for the purpose of acquiring the property upon which the center was to
be located and proceeding with the development.

(Tr. 8-9).

Prior to the formation of A. K. Utah Properties,
Inc. most of the International Center property was owned by
Jelco, Inc., a Utah corporation, but a part of one section
necessary for the development was owned by the Robert B.
Swaner Company (''Swaner") •

Shortly after its formation in

August, 1974, A. K. Utah acquired the majority of Jelco's
interest in the International Center property, CTr. 9) leaving the Swaner property as the remaining essential acquisition.
On or about September 25, 1974, A. K. Utah entered
into an exchange agreement with Swaner whereby it was agreed
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that Swaner would convey its interest in the International
Center property to A. K. Utah, Swaner would locate other property satisfactory to it, and A. K" Utah would purchase that
property and make a tax free exchange of such property for
Swaner's interest in the International Center property.
A. K. Utah's exchange agreement with the Swaner
company was eventually performed as modified at some time between mid-March and mid-April, 1975, pursuant to contingent
documents dated February 3, 1975, by A. K. Utah's purchase of
Fashion Fabric's interest in a building located at 2350 South
2300 West, Salt Lake City, Utah, and the contemporaneous ex-

change of that interest for Swaner's interest in the International Center property.

Neither A. K. Utah nor Jelco, Inc.

was ever at any time interested in purchasing the Fashion
Fabrics property for its own account.

A. K. Utah's only in-

terest in the property was the possible satisfaction of its
exchange agreement with the Robert B. Swaner Company.

It is

the consummation of that exchange transaction and the attendant sale of the Fashion Fabrics warehouse out of which the
instant controversy between Bonneville and Simons arises.
(Tr. 9-10).
In early December, 1974, Bonneville's agent met
with a representative of Jelco, Inc. with regard to the possibility that the Fashion Fabrics

prope~ty

form the Swaner exchange agreement.

might be used to per-

(Tr. 91.
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The Executive Vice-President of A. K. Utah, Mr.
Emanual A. Floor, testified that he was in charge of and had
"all the authority" with respect to the Fashion FabricsSwaner arrangement.

Mr, Floor further testified that Jelco,

Inc. had no authority to represent A. K. Utah and that neither
Bonneville, Sorensen or Christensen were ever retained to represent A. K. Utah on the transaction.

(Tr. 231-233)

Mr.

Floor's testimony is uncontroverted.
It is clear and uncontroverted, therefore, that
Bonneville represented no one in the transaction.

It is also

clear that Bonneville did nothing in the negotiations leading
up to the sale.

Bonneville's claim is based upon the sole

fact that it introduced the idea for the Fashion Fabrics transaction to Simons.

The trial court so concluded at Finding of

Fact paragraph 11 and Conclusion of Law number 5.
The uncontroverted testimony of Mr. Floor was that
prior to January 27, 1975, Jelco, Inc., or its representative,
was demanding payment to it of a "special fee" of $100,000.00,
which was not acceptable to either party to the transaction.
The trial court concluded at Conclusion of Law number 25 that
it was only after that requirement had been dropped that there
was any final agreement acceptable to either A. K. Utah (Tr.
237-239, 241), or Fashion Fabrics (Tr, 149-52).
Upon sale of the Fashion Fabrics warehou.se a payment
became due Simons and other brokers by the seller, Fashion
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Fabrics, in the a9gregate amount of $125,000.00.

Of this sum,

$25,000.00 was owed and paid to Slmons' referring broker, Jim

Shaunessey, and is not at issue in this lawsuit, leaving
$100,000.00 due Simons and any other broker entitled to share

in the commission.

Simon's commission split with other brokers

as published through the Salt Lake Board of Realtors at the
time contingent documents were executed, February 3, 1975, was
sixty percent to the listing broker and forty percent to the
selling broker.

(Tr. 10-11)

It was agreed by stipulation that Simons in fact believed that he was entitled to sixty percent, or $60,000.00,
and Simons agreed that Sorensen should receive forty percent,
or $40,000.00, in accordance with the published commission
split as of that date.

Fashion Fabrics could not afford to pay

the commission in a lump sum.

Simons, therefore, in order to

allow the sale to close and in an effort to help Fashion
Fabrics with its cash flow problems, agreed to accept payment
of the commission in installments.

Simons also agreed to a

separate agreement between Fashion Fabrics and Bonneville
whereby Bonneville got its share of the commission before
Simons got his because Christensen was in financial trouble.
Bonneville was paid $40,000.00 in cash.
Christensen $18,000.00.

Bonneville paid

In July, 1975, Fashion Fabrics had

run out of money and Simons agreed to and did accept restricted
stock in Fashion Fabrics in satisfaction of the remaining
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$22,000.00 due him.

Fashion Fabrics subsequently went out of

business and Simons' stock is valueless.

(~r.

11)

It is important to note that there was no agreement,
oral or written, between Bonneville, Sorensen or Christensen
and Simons with respect to any commission on the Fashion Fabrics
listing, apart from any agreement which might be implied or in
fact exist by virtue of the respective brokers' membership in
the Salt Lake Board of Realtors, Simons' offer of subagency
through the Multiple Listing Service, and custom
the trade.

and usage in

(Tr. 12)
Mr. B. L. Scott, Executive Secretary of the Salt Lake

Board of Realtors, testified by way of stipulation, and identified the Rules and Regulations governing operation of the
Multiple Listing Service.

(Ex. 2)

Mr. Scott's stipulated

testimony was that at the relevant time, when called upon to
arbitrate disputes between brokers regarding commission splits,
that the split in effect as of the date of a written and binding offer, if such offer did not vary from the terms of the
listing, was determinative.

(Tr. 18-19)

It is uncontro-

verted that no written, binding offer was ever submitted until
the transaction actually closed on or about March 27, 1975,
almost three months after Simons changed his commission split.
On or about June 3, 1976, Dennis Christensen filed
suit against Dan Simons in the United States District Court
for the District of Utah, Civil No. C 76-174, seeking damages
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for alleged violations of the antitrust laws of the United
States, alleging a conspiracy to deprive Christensen of his
fair share of the real estate conunission attributable to the
sale of the Fashion Fabrics property by virtue of Simons'
change in commission split, and a pendent claim for breach of
contract concerning the commission, all of which arose out of
the same transaction or occurrence which is the subject of the
instant action.

Simons and Christensen settled that lawsuit

pursuant to an agreement, a copy of which was attached to
Simons' trial brief as Exhibit ''A'', and Christensen executed a
general release of all claims in favor of Simons, a copy of
which was attached to Simons' trial brief as Exhibit "B".
Under the terms of Sorensen's agreement with Christensen in
effect when-the Fashion Fabrics warehouse was sold, Sorensen
would have been obligated to pay Christensen, after deducting
ten percent for expenses, fifty percent of any commission due
Sorensen on the sale.

(Tr. 13-14)

ARGUMENT
l?OINT I
FUNDAMENTAL UTAH LAW CONCERNING
UNILATERAL CONTRACTS OF SUBAGENCY
BETWEEN REAL ESTATE BROKERS IS IGNORED
Utah law is clear that a unilateral offer of subagency
between real estate brokers may be withdrawn at any time before
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it is accepted by producing a written, binding offer from a
ready, willing and able purchaser, on the terms specified in
the offer.
1977).

E.g., Boyer· Co. v. Lignell, 567 P. 2d 1112 (Utah

The trial court misconceived the law in that regard

and applied, instead, the minority rule of some other jurisdictions in general contract cases that substantial performance
gives rise to an implied promise not to revoke the original
offer.

See, RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, Section 45, Conunent g.
The minority rule of the Restatement has never been

adopted in Utah.

Even if it were, the facts supporting it are

not present in this case.

The issue of law here, therefore,

is whether the well settled Utah law governing brokerage commissions is to be abandoned in favor of a modified version of
the minority position.
A.

A Broker's Unilateral Offer Of Subagency May Be Withdrawn
Before It Is Accepted by Performance.
In essence, Bonneville claims that its agent,

Christensen, introduced Simons to the party which purchased
the Fashion Fabrics warehouse (Finding of Fact No. 11, Conclusion of Law No. 5); and that the "introduction of the
purchaser's name was significant" (Conclusion of Law No. 5)
to the transaction contemplated by Simons" open, unilateral
offer of subagency.

The necessary conclusion, though unarticu-

lated in the Findings and Conclusions, is that the mere act
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of introduction rendered Simons' offer irrevocable and not subject to modification.

Such a conclusion is not supported by

either the facts or the law.
There was no oral or written agreement between
Bonneville and Simons apart from any agreement implied by virtue
of their respective membership in the Salt Lake Board of
Realtors, the rules of the multiple listing service, and custom
and usage in the trade.

The uncontroverted testimony was that,

under those rules, Simons was entitled to change his commission
split (that is, to modify his offer of subagency) effective upon
publication in the next multiple listing service book, at any
time prior to the delivery of a written, binding offer meeting
all terms and conditions of the listing agreement or at any
time prior to the execution by buyer and seller of a written,
binding agreement to other terms.

(Findings of Fact No. 27,

stipulated testimony of B. L. "Nick" Scott, Executive Secretary,
Salt Lake Board of Realtors).
P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977).

See, Boyer Co. v. Lignell, 567

Here, Simons' modification was given

January 2, 1975, (Finding of Fact No. 15) and effective
January 10, 1975.

The trial court found it to be a fact, con-

clusive against the position of Bonneville under existing
Utah law, that on the effective date of modification, January
10, 1975, there was no written, binding agreement among the
parties to the exchange transaction which was eventually
consummated on March 27, 1975.

(Finding of Fact No. 16).

-12-
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Sorensen himself admitted that he had been informed by the
Board of Realtors that there was no point in

fili~g

a complaint

with the Board because Simons' change in his conunission split
was proper and Sorensen would lose,

(Tr. 98-101).

Prior to ·a·ctual pe:rforman·ce, it is of no consequence
that Bonneville made efforts to perform, which the trial court
considered "significant. "

As the Utah Court said in· E. B.

Wicks Co. v. Moyle, 103 Utah 554, 137 P.2d 342 C.1943):
A broker is never entitled to conunissions
for unsuccessful efforts. The risk of a failure is wholly his. The reward comes only with
his success. That is the plain contract and
contemplation of the parties. The broker may
devote his time and labor, and expend his
money with ever so much devotion to the interests of his employer, and yet if he fails,
if without effecting an agreement for accomplishing a bargain, he abandons the effort, or
his authority is fairly and in good faith terminated, he gains no right to conunissions.
Sibbald v. Bethlehem Iron Co., 83 N.Y. 378,
33 Am Rep. 441.
Performance which will constitute acceptance of the
offer of subagency must either be a binding offer embodying all
of the terms specified in the listing agreement, or constitute
buyer and seller's written, binding agreement to other terms.
Boyer, supra.

Finding a buyer satisfying· most of the terms,

or on terms substantially the same, qr even finding a buyer who
agrees to the same te.rms at a later date, clearly is not
sufficient.

E. B. Wicks Co., supra~

The correct statement of

the proposition on the facts of this case, is at RESTATEMENT
2d., AGENCY§ 447:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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An agent whose compensation is conditioned
upon his procuring a transaction on specified
terms is not entitled to such compensation if,
as a result of his efforts a transaction is
effected on different or modified terms, although the principal thereby benefits.

The Utah Court adopted this proposition verbatim in
E. B. Wicks Co., supra.

The facts of the Wicks case, moreover,

are dispositive against the position asserted by Bonneville
here for in Wicks the broker was held not entitled to a commission even though an agreement was reached with his client
at a later date.

Approp:os· the facts herein, where a commission

or "bribe" to Jelco had to be eliminated before there was an
offer acceptable to the parties (Finding of Fact No. 25) and
Simons had to complete complex negotiations, including many
with government authorities (Tr. 270-283 ), the Utah Court,
with Justice Wolf concurring separately, held in Wicks that
the mere fact that the seller (in that case a lessor) suffered
the loss of one months' rental made the performance sufficiently
different to preclude entitlement to a commission.
The logic of the foregoing holdings cannot be denied.
Simons' initial published listing was stipulated to be 60% "to
the selling broker." (emphasis added).
for a mere "finder •. "

No offer was ever made

When it became obvious that Simons would

himself have to perform the services his offer contemplated
(see testimony of Simons at Tr,

220-283)

concerning the

services performed and expenses incurred) it was not only fair,
but necessary, for him to change the commission split to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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reflect the reality of the transaction as it developed.

That

he nevertheless agreed to pay 40% to Bonneville, which had done
nothing, was in reality an act of_ generosity, for Bonneville
plainly was not the "selling broker."
If it were the law that the offering agent could not
revoke or modify an offer of subagency, even to another broker
who had undertaken efforts to perform, the result would be
sheer chaos.

The uncontroverted testimony in this case is that

Simons was entertaining offers from a large number of other
brokers simultaneously with the A. K. Utah-Swaner negotiations.
(Tr. 265-268).

If Bonneville were held entitled to complete

performance on the offer in effect prior to January 10, 1975,
merely because it had devoted efforts prior to that date, then
why not each of the other agents for the many other prospective
purchasers with whom Simons and Fashion Fabrics were negotiating
at the time?

The result might mean that an offering broker

could incur obligations to any number of performing subagents,
possibly after the property was already sold.

It would,

moreover, be plainly unfair to prohibit brokers from changing
their commission splits when the magnitude of time and expense
devoted to a particular listing made it unreasonable, uneconomical and unfair to continue to offer a more

advant~geous

split

with other brokers who had not yet produced the only thing that
counts--that being a sale.

The very operation of the real

estate industry would be impossible if confined by such
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rigid strictures.
B.

The Findings By The Trial Court Conclusively Deny Any
Acceptance Of The Offer.
The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law establish

that when Simons modified his offer of subagency with respect to
the commission split by letter of January 2, 1975, effective
January 10 ,· 1975, neither Bonneville nor anyone else had produced a written binding offer from a buyer ready, willing and
able to purchase on the terms listed, as required by the foregoing authorities.

Indeed, there could be no "ready, willing

and able buyer" until A. K. Utah and Swaner reached a binding
contract for satisfaction of the Swaner exchange agreement
(Finding of Fact No. 21), which event did not occur until the
transaction actually closed on March 27, 1975.
Fact No. 28).

(Finding of

Prior to that time, any talk about the Fashion

Fabrics building was precisely that--just talk.
Indeed, the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
entered by the trial court are conclusive that there could not
have been a valid acceptance before the commission split was
changed.

The trial court's finding that negotiations broke down

"during a period that Jelco, Inc. made persistent demands for an
additional commission of $100,000.00" [characterized by Stan
Shaw as a "bribe"]

(Finding of Fact No. 25) is conclusive against

the position of Bonneville under both Utah law and the minority
rule of the Restatement.
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The terms on which the Fashion :Fabrics warehouse were
sold, moreover differed significantly from those set forth in
the listing agreement..

(Tr.

2 7 8-8 3)

Moreover, Bonneville was not the ''selling broker" in
any sense.

The trial court determined as a fact (and, indeed,

Bonneville did not dispute) that neither Bonneville, Sorensen
or Christensen "represented A. K.. Utah as realtors at any time."
(Finding of Fact No. 11).

Bonneville had no client and Bonneville's

agent did not even show the subject property to the purchaser.
Bonneville did not represent the Robert B. Swaner Company.

That

entity was represented by Bernard Fallentine of Tracy Realty who
first showed Swaner the Fashion Fabrics warehouse and who conducted some of the negotiations concerning the proposed exchange
on behalf of Swaner.

(.Tr. 185-190

)•

Plaintiff did not repre-

sent Fashion Fabrics--Simons performed that role.
The only thing that Bonneville did do was have an idea
(one, it should be noted, that Fallentine had already had and
pursued)
idea.

(Tr. 130) and contact Jelco and Simons pursuant to that

(See Conclusion of Law No. 5).
The proposal being urged by Jelco with respect to sale

of the warehouse was, moreover, an entirely different deal than
that eventually consummated by :Fashion Fabrics, A. K. Utah and
Swaner because of Jelco's persistent demand of an additional
$100, 000. 00.

The transaction was never consummated until the

parties to the transaction were clear that Jelco and its demand
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for the extra $100,000.00 were completely out of the picture-which also occurred long after Simons changed his commission
split.

c.

Simons' Change In The Commission Split Was In Good Faith.
The controlling holding of this Court in E. B. Wicks

Co. v. Moyle, supra, does recognize that one who terminates a
unilateral offer (in this case, an offer of subagency) must do
so ''fairly and in good faith.''

Even on that score the facts are

conclusive against the position of Bonneville, however, for the
parties stipulated that ''Simons believed, therefore, that he was
entitled to sixty percent"

(Tr. 11) and the trial court deter-

mined "that the Defendant Simons in changing his commission split
as set forth in his letter of January 2, 1975, did so, acting in
good faith."

(Emphasis added)

(Finding of Fact No. 15) ..

''THE COURT:

Well, is there any dispute that he
did that in good faith? I have no reason [to
be.lieve] he didn't do it in good faith. " (Tr.
224)

Indeed, the trial court excluded all evidence offered by Simons
going to the question of his good faith, such as the extraordinary amount of time Simons had devoted to the matter, the

$20,000.00 in expenses he had incurred, and the extent of his
negotiations with brokers other than Bonneville, on the grounds
that such evidence was innnaterial, there being no question that
Simons had changed his split in good faith.

(Tr. 224)
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
AMEND ITS ANSWER OR AMEND THE
PLEADINGS TO CONFORM TO THE EVIDENCE
The defendant's answer to the amended complaint, dated
December 10, 1975, was prepared and signed by Ellen M. Maycock,
Esq., who was acting as counsel for defendant at that time.

Ms.

Maycock withdrew as counsel for defendant on March 6, 1980.

At

that point counsel herein, who had formerly ·been shown on the
pleadings but had no active role, assumed responsibility for the
litigation.

Six days prior to trial counsel for defendant

noticed a manifest factual error in the answer filed by defendant's former ·counsel--specifically, an admission that
Bonneville had introduced Simons to the party who purchased the
Fashion Fabrics warehouse.

The facts, never disputed by the

parties, were that Bonneville had introduced Simons to Jelco,
Inc. (not the purchaser) and that Jelco, Inc., in turn, had introduced Simons to the eventual purchaser, A. K. Utah.
Counsel for defendant inunediately telephoned counsel
for plaintiff, advised him of the manifest error and asked that
he stipulate for leave to amend.

He refused.

The following

day, five days before trial, counsel for Simons prepared, filed
and hand delivered to Bonneville's counsel a motion for leave
to amend the answer.

(See defendant's motion for leave to

amend, dated August 26, 1981).
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The motion was argued to the Honorable Homer F.
Wilkinson prior to trial, on August 31, 1981.

(Tr. 28-40}

In opposing the motion counsel for plaintiff argued in essence
that granting the motion would prejudice plaintiff by depriving
it of the ability to adduce evidence concerning any agency
relationship that may have existed between A. K. Utah and Jelco.
Specifically, plaintiff's counsel argued that when Bonneville's
agents introduced Simons to Jelco, the Jelco employee attending
that meeting, one Gary Jenkins, had stated that Jelco represented A. K. Utah.

At the time of trial Jenkins was no longer

with Jelco, resided in Phoenix, Arizona, and had not been deposed
by either party.

Counsel for plaintiff, therefore, claimed he

would be prejudiced by his inability to adduce testimony concerning Gary Jenkins' statement, which was plain hearsay in any
event.
Counsel for Simons then offered to stipulate that Mr.
Jenkins would so testify if called, but counsel for plaintiff
declined to accept that stipulation.

Counsel for Simons also

pointed out that A. K. Utah's executive vice president, Emanuel
A. Floor, was under subpoena by both parties and was available
to testify concerning what, if any, relationship existed between A. K. Utah and Jelco with respect to the Fashion Fabrics
transaction.
The court refused to continue the trial and denied
leave to amend.

(Tr. 37, 40)
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At trial all evidence adduced by both parties established the facts as recited in defendant's motion for leave
to amend, that is, that Bonneville introduced Simons to Jelco
and that Jelco subsequently introduced Simons to A. K. Utah.
No evidence was offered on the question of what, if any relationship existed between A. K. Utah and Jelco· be·f:o·re January
1, 1975, but the uncontroverted evidence conclusively established that from and after January 1, 1975, there was no agency
relationship whatsoever between A. K. Utah and Jelco.
At the conclusion of trial counsel for Simons moved
the court, again, for an order amending the pleadings to conform to the evidence.

The court denied that motion, despite

the clear mandate of Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
The court then entered Findings of Fact numbers 11 and 12:
"11. That Plaintiff, by and through its
agents, L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis
Christensen, met with the Defendant Simons
in December, 1974, at the offices of Gary
Jenkins, and that at such meeting and at
such time disclosed to Defendant Simons
that A. K. Utah Properties was a prospective
purchaser of the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse,
but that neither Plaintiff nor its agents,
L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis Christensen,
represented A. K. Utah as realtors at any
time."
·
12. That the Plaintiff's agent, as admitted in the Defendant's pleadings, introduced to the Defendant the party who purchased the Fashion Fabrics Warehouse, and the
Plaintiff, through its agent or agents, introduced to the Defendant the name of A. K.
Utah as a prospective purchaser, such introduction occurring at a meeting in the off ices
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of Jelco, Inc. Plaintiff never personally
introduced A. K. Utah to Defendant."
The finding that plaintiff introduced defendant Simons
to the party who purchased· the warehouse is not supported by an
iota of evidence.

It is, rather, based solely on the erroneous

admission set forth in paragraph 6 of defendant's answer.
Moreover, the court's other findings with respect to Bonneville's
relationship to the transaction are completely inconsistent with
the conclusion that Bonneville introduced Simons to the purchasers.

The court found that "neither Plaintiff nor its agents,

L. Richard Sorensen and Dennis Christensen, represented A. K.
Utah as realtors at any time'' (Findings of Fact No. 11) and
that plaintiff never personally introduced defendant to A. K.
Utah and that all plaintiff did was introduce Simons ''to the
name of A. K. Utah as a prospective purchaser."
Fact No. 12) (emphasis added).

(Findings of

It is patently inconsistent with

interests of justice and grossly unfair to bind the defendant
Simons to a manifest error concerning a fact which was never in
dispute and which was contained in

~

pleading he did not prepare

and did not sign.
Utah law, and indeed, the law in every jurisdiction,
is that failure to permit leave to amend to correct such a manifest error, or to conform to the evidence, is an abuse of discretion.

Rule 15(a], Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, so provides.

Gillman v. Hansen, 26 Utah 2d. 165, 486 P.2d 1045 (1971}; cf.
v. Ganey, 23 Utah 633, 66 Pac. 190 (1901}.

See, also, First
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~hy

Security Bank of Utah v. Co·lonial Ford, Inc., 597 P.2d 859
(Utah 19791.

POINT III
THE JUDGMENT SHOULD BE REVERSED TO
CORRECT MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW AND PROCEDURE
The trial court committed numerous other errors requiring reversal, as follows:
A.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction Was Lacking.
At the commencement of trial counsel moved to dismiss

for the reason that Bonneville lacked statutory authority to
maintain this action.

In that regard, Utah Code Annotated,

Section 61-2-18 provides:
No person, partnership, association or
corporation shall bring or maintain an action
in any court of this state for the recovery
of commission, a fee, or compensation for any
act done or service rendered • • • unless such
person is duly licensed hereunder as a real
estate broker • • • •
The evidence is clear and uncontroverted that Bonneville
is not so licensed.

Mr. Steven Francis, the director of the

Real Estate Division of the State of Utah, so indicated by
affidavit (Tr. 40) and further testified to that effect.
209)

(Tr.

This Court has given literal effect to the prohibitions of

the statute.

Diversified General Corporation

Course, I'nc., 584 P.2d 848 (Utah 19781; Chas·e

v.

White Barn Golf

v. Mo·rg·an, 339 P.2d

1018 (Utah 1959); Young v. Buchanan, 259 P. 2d 976 (Utah 1953).
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B.

Denial Of Prof·erred P'roo·f On Custom And. us·ag·e· Was An Abuse
Of Discretion.
It was stipulated between the parties that Bonneville's

claim that a contract for sixty percent of the commission existed could derive only from "the parties' membership in the
multiple listing service, the rules thereof, and custom and usage
in the trade."

(Tr. 12)

Yet, when Simons proferred proof of

the trade's custom and usage to rebut Bonneville's claim of
contract, it was excluded by the trial court.

(Tr. 283-291)

In so doing the trial court abused its discretion and committed
reversible error.
C.

Award Of Pre-Judgment Interest wa·s E:rror.
Damages awarded by the trial court included pre-judgment

interest in the sum of $3,703.23.

We know of no authority for

such an award.
D.

Any Claim Of Bonneville Has Been Waived.
It is clear on the stipulated facts that any claim of

Bonneville is necessarily based upon its agent, ChFistensen,
suggesting an "idea" to Simons.

Yet, Christensen brought suit

on that very claim in the federal courts and compromised his
claim with Simons.

(Tr. 13)

It is familiar that the related

rules of res judicata, collateral estoppel, waiver and release
are for the "purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of
relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his
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privy,••

Parkl·ane· Ho:siery Company, 'Inc.

326 (19791.

v,

Sho·re, 439 U.S. 322,

The rule should bar the claim asserted herein.
CONCLUSION
The conclusion reached by the trial court is a novel

approach to unilateral contracts in the real estate industry,
never adopted by this or any other jurisdiction.

Under the

trial court's holding once a broker communicates an "idea"
that is "significant" to an eventual sale transaction, the
listing broker may not modify his unilateral of fer of subagency.

The listing broker may not do so, even if the broker

having the "idea" represents no one, produces no purchaser and
does not even perform services which are "substantial" as required by the minority rule.
Unless this Court is prepared to abandon its well
settled requirement of producing a "ready, willing and able
buyer" on the "terms of the offer" for the innovative rule
adopted by the.trial court, this case must be reversed.
Respectfully submitted this

j?d,

day of

September, 1982.
PARKER M. NIELSON
MARY LOU GODBE

By

~,.

: ' < · : ' . , . _ - ,;~ , ,,. ,

/~

· ~o

"'"Attorneys for Appelant
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